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EFN REPORT 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA IN 2015 and 2016 
Highlights 
 
• At the beginning of the year 2015 crude oil is, with little more than 50 dollars 
per barrel (Brent), about 50% cheaper than in the summer 2014. The oil price 
hike is a stimulus for the whole world economy, even though the gains of energy 
users are matched by losses of the suppliers: oil producing countries frequently 
run high current account surpluses vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is therefore 
plausible to assume that, reacting to the redistribution of incomes, the oil user 
countries will increase their spending by more than what will be lost in spending 
by producers.  
• Investment activity in the euro area has recently been particularly weak. 
Remarkably, investment in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, i.e. in countries that had 
to accept international support during the euro crisis, has strengthened. The 
setback took place in the so-called core countries, including Germany. 
Consumption growth was also subdued. Lower oil prices, by increasing real 
incomes of consumers and lowering production costs for firms, should increase 
private consumption and, in particular, investment. Moreover, the depreciation 
of the euro will favour exports. 
• Overall, according to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.3% in 
2015 and by 1.6% in 2016. GDP growth is about 0.3 percentage points higher 
due to the impact of lower oil prices in 2015. However, these forecasts are 
subject to substantial uncertainty, and we do not see any significant reduction of 
the unemployment rate during the forecasting horizon. 
• Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.3%, with the possibility of a mild deflation 
not excluded. In 2016 inflation will increase up to 1.1%, still clearly below the 
2% ECB’s target. This calls for further monetary expansion, though its effects 
could be limited in the absence of a complementary fiscal stimulus. 
• The expansionary cyclical policies should be combined with more structural 
reforms to enhance the competitiveness of the euro area and its growth potential, 
which in our forecasts remains quite limited. In fact, we expect potential output 
to grow by only 0.4% both in 2015 and 2016. 
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Table 1 Economic outlook for the Euro area 
  2012 2013 2014 2015: 1st half 2015: annual 2016: annual 
        
Point 
Forecast 
Interval 
Forecast 
Point 
Forecast 
Interval 
Forecast 
Point 
Forecast 
Interval 
Forecast 
GDP -0.7 -0.5 0.8 1.5 
0.5 
1.3 
0.5 
1.6 
0.6 
2.5 2.1 2.6 
Potential Output 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 
-0.4 
0.4 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
1.6 0.7 0.8 
Private Consumption -0.7 -0.4 0.8 0.6 
0.0 
0.8 
-0.1 
0.7 
-0.3 
1.2 1.6 1.7 
Government Consumption 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 
-0.3 
0.6 
0.0 
0.4 
-0.3 
1.1 1.1 1.0 
Fixed Capital Formation -3.4 -2.4 0.7 1.8 
-1.7 
1.0 
-1.9 
3.0 
-0.4 
5.2 4.0 6.3 
Exports 2.4 2.0 3.8 6.1 
4.3 
5.9 
4.4 
6.3 
4.7 
7.9 7.4 7.9 
Imports -1.1 1.2 3.9 6.3 
3.8 
6.4 
4.2 
6.1 
3.8 
8.9 8.6 8.4 
Unemployment Rate 11.3 12.0 11.6 11.1 
10.5 
11.1 
10.6 
10.9 
10.1 
11.7 11.7 11.7 
Labour Cost Index 2.4 1.2 1.2 2.2 
1.6 
1.9 
1.4 
2.6 
1.8 
2.9 2.5 3.4 
Labour Productivity -0.2 0.3 0.5 1.2 
0.4 
0.9 
0.2 
1.3 
0.5 
2.0 1.5 2.0 
HICP 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
-0.3 
1.1 
0.1 
0.4 0.9 2.1 
IPI -2.5 -0.6 0.6 0.5 
-1.0 
0.9 
-1.1 
1.5 
1.2 
2.0 2.9 4.2 
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for the output gap that is 
the deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP as a per cent of potential GDP and except for the unemployment 
rate. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are taken from EFN forecasting model and based on 2000 stochastic 
simulations.  
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Economic Outlook for 2015 and 2016 
 
The world economy: oil price crash adds to regional divergences  
At the beginning of 2015, the main economic regions continue to diverge: the USA and 
Britain are in an upswing, whereas production in the euro area is only little more than 
stagnating, and in Japan production has been decreasing for the past two quarters. In 
China growth dynamics continue to slow down. The Russian economy is at the brink of 
a financial crisis: the currency has, during the second half of 2014, lost almost 40% of 
its value relative to the dollar, as confidence erodes due to economic sanctions related to 
the Ukrainian conflict and, even more importantly, due to the precipitous fall of oil 
prices since summer 2014.  
In early January crude oil is, with little more than 50 dollars per barrel (Brent), about 
50% cheaper than in the summer. The main causes are twofold: first, slowing growth in 
emerging markets dampens demand for oil, because production in emerging economies 
frequently is highly energy-intensive. Second, supply has expanded by much recently, 
driven in particular by unconventional oil and gas extraction in the USA. Saudi-Arabia, 
the decisive swing-producer on world oil markets, has decided not to stabilize the price 
by reducing its own supply. The motivation is as follows: with a low price, US 
producers will stop expanding supply from unconventional sources, as it no longer pays 
off, and the traditional producers will be able to defend their market share. As long as 
the Saudi government has this objective in mind (and supply is not interrupted for other 
reasons), oil prices will probably stay markedly lower than during the past four years, 
when they hovered between 100 and 110 dollars. 
Everywhere, much lower oil prices dampen price dynamics significantly. This is one 
reason why monetary policy in countries with buoyant economies, such as the USA and 
Britain, will only very slowly become less expansive. In the euro area and in Japan, 
central banks intend to further apply some forms of quantitative easing to stimulate the 
weak economies. The Japanese government has announced another, albeit moderate, 
fiscal program and will abstain from a formerly planned second consumption tax hike in 
2015. Since fiscal policy will be neutral or only slightly restrictive in the euro area and 
the USA, Britain is the only large advanced economy where fiscal consolidation will 
continue markedly in 2015 and 2016. Policy in some emerging markets such as in 
Brazil, however, is bound to be restrictive in order to preserve confidence in economic 
stability. The most notable example is Russia, where the central bank in mid December 
tried to stabilize the rouble by increasing the key interest rate from 10.5% to 17%. 
Clearly, a major risk for the world economy is that the oil price fall triggers deep 
economic crises in producer economies such as Russia that, mainly by way of financial 
markets, spills over to other economies.  
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If such grave crises can be avoided, most advanced economies will benefit from low oil 
prices. This is true even more so for those emerging economies that import most of their 
energy. Real incomes of consumers will be lifted and production costs for firms will be 
reduced. There is also a good chance for a stimulus for the whole world economy, even 
though the gains of energy users appear to be matched by losses of the suppliers: oil 
producers save a lot of their income; the 18 largest ones had, in 2013, a current account 
surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the world of almost a quarter of their GDP. It is therefore 
plausible to assume that, as the price fall distributes income from oil producers to users, 
the latter ones will increase their spending by more than what will be lost in spending 
by producers. Thus, chances are good that the speed of growth in the world economy, 
having been at about average level in 2014, will be a bit higher in 2015 and 2016. 
 
The euro area economy: a difficult recovery 
A clear indication for a marked recovery in the euro area is still missing. Production 
expanded by about 0.5% (annualized) during the two mid-year quarters. Particularly 
weak was investment activity, with gross fixed capital accumulation shrinking by 1.7% 
(again annualized). Remarkably, investment in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, i.e. in 
countries that had to accept international support during the euro crisis, has 
strengthened, and the setback took place in the so-called core countries, including 
Germany. In contrast, exports, growing by more than 4%, performed reasonably well, 
while private consumption expanded by about 1 ½%.  
Particularly worrying is the situation in Italy. The potential for production has, 
according to estimates of the European Commission, been decreasing since the Great 
Recession in 2009, and the capital stock (gross fixed assets excluding housing) has been 
shrinking since 2012. The unemployment rate has started increasing again in the 
summer, and is now well above 13%. 
The labour market in the euro area as whole has stabilized: employment and the number 
of hours worked have been slowly increasing for more than a year, and the 
unemployment rate fell to 11.5%. Since August, however, the rate has stopped 
decreasing, and expectations for a significant recovery have been disappointed. This is 
one cause why the policy of consolidating public households has come to an end in 
most countries. The new Commission’s investment program is, however, not a decisive 
turn to expansive fiscal policy, since overall public expenditure will barely rise. The 
short run effects of the program will probably be minor.  
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Figure 1 Quarterly GDP growth rates and confidence bands 
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Figure 2 Contributions of domestic components and net exports to GDP growth  
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The economy still appears sluggish during this winter. Confidence indicators (see 
Figure 3) and order books have little moved during the past months. For the whole year 
a strong recovery is not in sight, because it is still unclear whether structural reforms in 
important member countries will be realized. In addition, firms and, in particular, 
private households can only slowly reduce their debt burdens, and banks will not stop 
trying to strengthen their capital in 2015. Two external factors, however, will give a 
sizable stimulus to the economy: the real effective exchange rate of the euro is nearly 
10% lower than in spring 2014 and at a level below its long run mean, strengthening the 
international competitiveness of euro area firms. Even more important is the fall of the 
oil price by more than 40% (calculated in euros) since summer 2014. As mentioned 
above, real incomes of consumers will be lifted and production costs for firms will be 
reduced. According to the simulations carried out with the EFN model, GDP growth 
will be 0.3 percentage points higher due to an oil price of 53 dollars instead of 108 
dollars in 2015.  
All in all, the euro area economy will, according to our forecast, grow by 1.3% in 2015 
and by 1.6% in 2016, with a rather stable performance across the quarters (see Figure 1) 
and most of the growth coming from domestic demand (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3 Economic Sentiment Indicator and confidence bands  
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Table 2 Annual average rates for industrial production in the euro area 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Durable 0.7 -4.9 -3.5 -1.2 -2.8 -1.2 
Non Durable 1.0 -2.1 -0.1 3.1 2.2 2.5 
Capital 8.5 -1.1 -0.5 1.6 1.5 2.7 
Intermediate 4.1 -4.5 -1.0 1.1 -0.4 0.6 
Energy -4.5 -0.4 -1.1 -5.4 0.0 0.8 
Total 3.4 -2.5 -0.7 0.6 0.9 1.5 
 
Figure 4 HICP and confidence bands 
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Industrial production with also expand, by about 0.9% in 2015 and 1.5% in 2016, with 
the largest contributions coming from non-durable and capital goods (see Table 2). 
Finally, our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.3%, with the possibility of a mild deflation 
not excluded (see Figure 4). In 2016 inflation will increase up to 1.1%, still clearly 
below the 2% ECB’s target. This calls for further monetary expansion, though its effects 
could be limited in the absence of a complementary fiscal stimulus. 
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Comparison with alternative forecasts 
The forecasts presented above were obtained from the EFN macroeconometric model, 
described in detail in the EFN Spring 2002 report. Table 3 shows a comparison of the 
EFN forecasts for the main macroeconomic aggregates with other forecasts, notably 
those of the European Commission, the IMF, the ECB, the OECD, and Consensus 
Economics.  
The EFN forecast is relatively optimistic for 2015, because we think that the steep fall 
in the oil price and the weaker euro will stimulate the otherwise sluggish economy. 
Aggregates of final demand grow mostly a bit slower than those of other forecasts; this 
is compensated by a buildup of inventories that currently stay at very low levels.  
 
Table 3 Comparison of EFN forecasts with alternative forecasts 
  EFN EU IMF ECB OECD Consensus 
  2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 
GDP 1.3 1.6   1.1   1.7 1.3 na   1.0 1.5 1.1 1.7 1.1 na 
Priv. Consumption 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.2 na 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 na 
Gov. Consumption 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.2 na 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 na 
Fixed Capital Form. 1.0 3.0 1.7 3.9 2.0 na 1.4 3.2  1.2 3.1 1.3 na 
Unemployment rate 11.1 10.9 11.3 10.8  11.2     na 11.2 10.9 11.1 10.8 11.3 na 
HICP 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.9 na 0.7 1.3 0.6 1.0 0.6 na 
IP 0.9 1.5 na na na na na na na na 1.4 na 
EU: European Commission, Economic Forecast, November 2014; IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2014; ECB: ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, December 2014, OECD: Economic Outlook, November 2014; Consensus: Consensus Economics Inc., Consensus 
Forecasts, December 2014. ECB figures correspond to their macroeconomic projections. Numbers in the table refer to the mean of 
the respective projected interval. 
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Variables of the world economy 
Assumptions concerning the evolution of important variables related to the state of the 
world economy are shown in Table 4 below. We assume that the oil price will, after its 
steep fall at the end of 2014, rise in 2015 and 2016, but only very slowly. Growth in 
world trade accelerates, but stays below the trend of the past 20 years or so. The 
exchange rates of the dollar and the yen relative to the euro are assumed to be stable. 
 
Table 4 Variables of the world economy 
  2014 2015 2016 
US GDP Growth Rate 2.3 3.0 2.8 
US Consumer Price Inflation 1.7 1.3 1.9 
US Short Term Interest Rate (December) 0.1 1.0 1.8 
US Long Term Interest Rate (December) 2.3 2.7 3.8 
Japan GDP Growth Rate 0.3 1.2 1.0 
Japan Consumer Price Inflation 2.8 1.4 1.5 
Japan Short Term Interest Rate (December) 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Japan Long Term Interest Rate (December) 0.4 0.6 0.8 
World Trade Growth Rate 3.4 4.6 4.6 
Oil Price (December) 70 53 57 
USD/Euro Exchange Rate (December) 1.25 1.25 1.25 
100Yen/Euro Exchange Rate (December) 1.43 1.43 1.43 
Apart from the development of world trade, long term interest rates and nominal exchange rates, all variables 
are exogenous to the EFN forecast, mostly close to those of Consensus Economics (2014). The oil price is in 
US dollar per barrel (Brent). US short term interest rate: 3-month treasury bills. US long term interest rates: 
10-year treasury bills. Japan short term interest rate: 3-month deposits (LIBOR). Japan long term interest 
rates: 10-year treasury bills. 
 
